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THE IMPACT OF SMITH V. MARYLAND,
442 U.S. 735 (1979),
ON THE LAW OF PEN REGISTERS
MARK BIALEK*
INTRODUCTION

In Smith v. Maryland,' the Supreme Court was presented with
2
the question of whether the installation and use of a pen register
constitutes a "search" under the fourth amendment. 3 The pen register is a device which can be used to determine the telephone numbers
dialed from a phone under investigation or the number of rings on
calls coming into the phone. The question was raised by petitioner
Michael Lee Smith, who was convicted of robbery, at least in part,
based on evidence obtained from the installation and use of a pen
register. 4 Smith claimed that the use of a pen register was a search
under the fourth amendment and, therefore, the police should have
obtained a search warrant prior to its inception.
The Court in Smith determined that the installation and use of a
pen register does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment
and thus requires no warrant. This decision terminated a long standing quest for a resolution of the conflict surrounding the suitability of
a fourth amendment basis for judicial supervision of pen registers.5 In

*Antioch School of Law, J.D. 1981; Suffolk University, B.S. 1977.
1 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
2The pen register is a device attached to a given telephone line usually at a central
telephone office. A pulsation of the dial or the line to which the pen register is
attached records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed. The
paper tape then becomes a permanent and complete record of the outgoing numbers
called on the particular line. With reference to incoming calls, the pen register
records only a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not identify the number
from which the incoming call originated. The pen register cuts off after the number
is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is concluded on incoming calls
without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is answered.
There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation.
United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4 See notes 15-19, infra, and accompanying text, for discussion of the evidence acquired
preceding indictment.
I See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (J. Powell, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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United States v. Giordano,6 Justice Powell, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, stated, "the permissibility of [the pen register's] use
by law enforcement authorities depends entirely on compliance with
the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 7 Several
Circuit Courts8 have reiterated Justice Powell's statement regarding
pen registers and compliance with the fourth amendment. Two Circuit Courts, 9 however, concluded that the use of pen registers did not
invoke fourth amendment protections.' 0 Prior to Smith, the Supreme
Court had never decided whether "pen register surveillance [is] subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.""
In determining that fourth amendment protections do not extend
to the use of pen registers, the Supreme Court in Smith was not called
upon to specify which statutory or other protections, if any, might
apply. One result of the Smith decision will be the resurrection of the
debate between those who have said that there need not be any
962 (1975); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); Application of
United States for an Order, Etc., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. United
States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v.
Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974). These courts held that compliance with the fourth amendment was necessary when the police or FBI sought to use pen registers. But see United States v.
Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254
(9th Cir. 1977) (the use of pen registers does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment, and compliance therewith was not necessary). Cf. Application of United States of America
in the Matter of an Order, Etc., 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (the Second Circuit held that use of pen
registers constitutes a search under the fourth amendment but the Supreme Court reversed on
other grounds and expressly refused to decide the applicability of the fourth amendment to pen
registers).
6 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
7 Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added). Justice Powell expressly refused to determine that the use
of a pen register constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. Id. at 554, n.2.
8 United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. John,
508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974). In each of
these cases a warrant had been issued and, as compliance with the fourth amendment was
satisfied, the courts did not address the question of whether the use of a pen register constitutes a
search.
' United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
10In United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit held that the use
of a pen register to obtain "information concerning the dates and times of calls placed for a
particular phone and the numbers dialed does not offend the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 610.
The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment "protects only the content of a telephone
conversation and not the fact that a call was placed or that a particular number was dialed." Id.
In Hedge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit
held that "the information recorded by pen registers is not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections." Id. at 256-57. The Court reasoned that the information obtained from the use of
pen registers is different from the information obtained from billing records of the telephone
company and is "farther removed ... from the content of the communications." Id.
" United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 165, n.7. See Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. at 739, n.3.
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procedural protections in the use of pen registers,' 2 and others who
from the fourth
have said that authority exists, or should exist, aside
3
amendment, to control the use of pen registers.'
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SMITH V. MARYLAND,

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
The victim in Smith v. Maryland,1 4 Patricia McDonough, was
robbed on the sidewalk leading to her home, shortly after midnight on
March 5, 1976. McDonough was able to give police a description of
her assailant.' 5 Just prior to the robbery, McDonough observed a
man in her neighborhood changing a tire on a 1975 Monte Carlo
automobile. McDonough was able to give police a description of this
automobile.
Within several days of the robbery, McDonough received threatening and obscene telephone calls from a man who claimed responsibility for the robbery.' 6 In one instance, the caller asked McDonough
to step onto her front porch, where she observed the same 1975 Monte
Carlo that had been near the scene of the crime move past her home.
On March 16, the police spotted the 1975 Monte Carlo and a
man fitting the description given by McDonough, in the general
vicinity of McDonough's home. The police traced the license plate
number to the petitioner, Michael Lee Smith. On March 17, the
telephone company installed a pen register on Smith's telephone, at
police request. The police did not attempt to obtain a warrant or
court order prior to the installation of the pen register. The pen
register revealed that a call was placed on March 17 from Smith's
phone to McDonough's home. On the basis of this evidence, and
7
evidence of similar calls prior to the installation of the pen register,
the police secured a search warrant for Smith's residence. In executing
the warrant, the police found Smith's telephone book opened to a
"2See note 10 supra.
See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), notes 81-86 infra, and
accompanying text (employing Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 as authority to control the use of pen registers); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976), and Application of
United States of America in the Matter of an Order, Etc., 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), note 87
infra, and accompanying text (employing a court's inherent judicial power as authority to
control the use of pen registers); Application of United States of America for an Order, Etc., 616
F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1980), notes 88-91 infra, and accompanying text (employing the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), as authority to control the use of pen registers).
14 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
'5 McDonough claimed to have had a full-face view of her assailant when her pocketbook
was forcibly taken from her, although she was approached and grabbed from behind.
"0McDonough tape recorded these conversations and eventually gave the tapes to the police.
17 See note 16 supra.
'3
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page listing Patricia McDonough's name and telephone number. The
phone book was seized. The police arrested Smith and, on March 19,
McDonough identified him at a lineup. Subsequently, Smith was
indicted for robbery.
In a pre-trial motion,' 8 Smith moved under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution to suppress all the "fruits"' 9 of
the pen register. He claimed the police should have obtained a search
warrant prior to the installation of the pen register. The Maryland
trial court denied Smith's motion, and, after Smith waived a jury
trial, the trial court convicted him of robbery, and sentenced him to
ten years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld
the conviction on the ground that, "there is no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a
telephone system and hence no search within the fourth amendment is
implicated by the use of a pen register installed at the central offices of
the telephone company. ' 20 Three of the seven Judges dissented.
Digges, Eldridge and Cole (separate opinion), JJ., found a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the use of one's home telephone which
included the numbers which are dialed from the telephone. Petitioner
appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to resolve the
conflict 2 l among Circuit Courts concerning the degree of procedural
protections afforded by the fourth amendment in the use of pen
registers.
In resolving whether government activity constitutes a "search"
under the fourth amendment, the Court applied the leading case on
the scope of fourth amendment protection from unlawful searches
18 In other pre-trial motions, Smith sought to suppress the evidence obtained by the tape
recordings (i.e. calls made by Smith, to McDonough, prior to the installation of the pen register),
as well as the lineup identification. The motions were based on violations of the Maryland Code
(1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 17, § 125A(a), and the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, §
10-402. The trial judge overruled the former motion and the defendant withdrew the latter
motion before the judge ruled on it.
" The exclusionary rule extends to all evidence that is the "fruit" of an illegal search or
arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The test for whether the evidence is
considered the fruit of an unlawful search or arrest is whether the evidence has been obtained by
"exploitation" of the unlawful conduct, or has it been obtained by other means, "sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Id. at 488. The "fruits" which Smith
endeavored to suppress comprised the evidence which the pen register produced (that a call was
placed on March 17 from Smith's phone to McDonough's home), and all the evidence derived
therefrom (Smith's telephone book seized during the subsequent search of his residence and the
line-up identification by McDonough).
20 Smith v. Maryland, 283 Md. 156, 173, 389 A.2d 858, 867 (1978).
21 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
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and seizures, Katz v. United States.2 2 In Katz, the defendant was
convicted for transmitting wagering information by telephone from
23
Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute.
At trial, the government introduced, over the petitioner's objection,
evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations which the
FBI had overheard by attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which the
petitioner had placed several calls. On appeal, the petitioner argued
that the recordings had been acquired in violation of the fourth
amendment because no search warrant had been secured prior to the
attachment of the wiretap. The Court of Appeals, 24 affirming the
conviction, rejected this argument since "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." '2 5 The Supreme
Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, repudiated the argument that
a "search" can arise only if there is a "physical intrusion" into a
"constitutionally protected area," observing that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places."' 26 Invalidating the "trespass" doctrine espoused by the Court of Appeals, the Court noted that "the
reach of [the fourth amendment] cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. ' 27 Accordingly, the Court held that the government's activities violated the
petitioner's privacy while he used the telephone booth "and thus
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976). That statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a
wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or
contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that sporting
event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.
24 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1967).
25 Id. at 134.
21 389 U.S. at 351-53.
27 Id. at 353. Also, "[tihe fact that the electrical device employed to achieve that end did not
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance." Id. Contra,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1940):
Although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without
any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of
the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that
decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs
23
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constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment,- 28 and required a duly executed search warrant.
The majority in Katz found that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve
as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. "29 Justice'Harlan, concurring, restated these tests.
In order to be protected by the fourth amendment, Justice Harlan
would institute a twofold requirement: first, a person must have
exhibited "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and, second,
that expectation of privacy must be "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "30 Justice Harlan's view of the majority's
holding has been accepted by most courts as the standard for deter31
mining whether a fourth amendment "search" has occurred.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Smith, utilized the
two Katz tests articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion.
First, in determining whether the petitioner exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, the Court looked to the nature of the
government activity being challenged. Although the installation of the
pen register took place at the telephone company's central offices, the
Court stated, pursuant to Katz, that the petitioner need not claim that
his "property" was invaded or that a "constitutionally protected area"
had been trespassed by the police.
Petitioner claimed, in accordance with Katz, that the police
"infringed a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy. "32 Petitioner argued
that he made the phone calls in his own home, and this conduct
demonstrated his expectation of privacy.
Noting that a pen register discloses the telephone numbers that
have been dialed and not the contents of the communication, nor

not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording or oral
statements overheard without any "technical trespass under ***local property law."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
389 U.S. at 351-53.
, 389 U.S. at 351.
389 U.S. at 361.
3'See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980) "As
stated more explicitly in Justice Harlan's oft-cited concurring opinion, the Court established a
two-part test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment search and seizure occurred." Id. at
329. Also, United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979) "Supreme Court decisions
since Katz have generally used this 'privacy' formulation to determine issues of the fourth
amendment's scope." Id. at 1197.
32 442 U.S. at 741.
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33
whether communication occurred, the Court doubted that people
entertain an actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial:

All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers
to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers
realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for maksee a list
ing permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they
34
of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.
The Court recognized that telephone companies routinely use
pen registers "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and preventing violations of law,"' 35 and stated that most
people "presumably have some awareness of one common use: to aid
36
in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene calls."
The Court observed that telephone directories usually contain a "Consumer Information" section which explains that the telephone company "is anxious to help stop abusive calls; full cooperation and technical assistance will be given to legal authorities as an aid to enforcing
37
the law."
Petitioner argued that, despite the expectations of most telephone
subscribers and users, he had demonstrated an expectation of privacy
since he "us[ed] the telephone in his house to the exclusion of all
others.- 38 Finding the site of the call immaterial, 39 the Court held
that, "[a]lthough the petitioner's conduct may have been calculated to
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and
could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number
' 40
he dialed."
3 The question of whether the telephone company can assert a violation of any rights
belonging to it under the fourth amendment was not raised in this opinion.
442 U.S. at 742.
35 Id. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75.
38 442 U.S. at 742.
37 See, e.g., District of Columbia Telephone Directory 14 (1980); Northern Virginia
Telephone Directory 16 (1981). However, as Justice Marshall elucidates in his dissent:
I decline to assume general public awareness of how obscene phone calls are
traced. . . .But even assuming, as I do not, that individuals 'typically know' that a
phone company monitors calls for internal reasons . . . it does not follow that they
expect this information to be made available to the public in general, or the government in particular.
442 U.S. at 749, n.1.
38 Brief for Petitioner at 6 (emphasis added).
3' "Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete the call." 442 U.S. at 743.
40 Id. Only the ensuing conversation is protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
However, a distinction should be drawn between expectations of privacy versus expectations of
secrecy. The Court uses these terms interchangeably. An individual may reasonably expect that
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Applying the second Katz test, whether the petitioner's alleged
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable, the Court looked to other instances where an individual
claimed an expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
41
turned over to third parties. Relying upon United States v. Miller,
which held that a depositor in a bank had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in financial information voluntarily conveyed to banks, the
majority found that the telephone company's ability to record numbers dialed is common knowledge. As a result, when petitioner used
the telephone, he "voluntarily conveyed" numerical information to
the telephone company and "assumed the risk" that it would be
turned over to the police. 42 Accordingly, the Court found that, even
if the petitioner maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers he dialed in his home, this expectation is not one
that society recognizes as reasonable.
Petitioner conceded 43 that if he had placed the telephone calls
through an operator, he would not be able to claim a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The Court found that the absence of a live
operator could have no effect on petitioner's legitimate expectation of
privacy. In its view, the electronic switching equipment that processes
telephone connections was "merely the modern counterpart of the
operator who in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the
the telephone numbers which are revealed to the telephone company through its billing procedures will be known to certain telephone company employees (and computers) as well as the
person whose number has been dialed. Hence, there is privacy in this instance without total
secrecy. Once this information is turned over to the police or FBI, however, any vestige of
privacy is lost. The real question is whether an individual reasonably expects this information to
be revealed to law enforcement authorities.
41 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
41 The applicability of Miller is questionable because it concerned a civil action where a
federal statute mandated certain record-keeping practices be performed by banks. Title I, of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, required financial institutions to
maintain records of their customers' identities, to make microfilm copies of checks and similar
instruments. See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). On the contrary,
Smith is a criminal action and the telephone companies are not mandated by federal law to
maintain records of all telephone calls made by the subscribers. Additionally, the Court's
relience on Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963) is misguided. In Couch, there was mandatory disclosure of records relevant to an income
tax return. White, Hoffa, and Lopez involved situations where a party to conversations with the
defendant revealed the conversation to the police. In these instances, the defendant invited the
other party to meet with him for a discussion. Accordingly, the defendant could not claim a
legitimate expectation of privacy when it turns out that he had "misplaced confidence" in a
trusted colleague who communicated with the police. In the instant case, petitioner did not
invite the telephone company to have conversations with him, thereby relying on a "misplaced
confidence" that the telephone company would reveal the details of the conversation.
41 Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-5, 11-12, 32.
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subscriber." 44 The Court was not predisposed to find a different
result because of modern automation.
Petitioner also contended that an operator, in theory, could remember each telephone number transmitted to her by callers while
electronic switching equipment, conversely, only "remembers" information it is programmed to record. Since telephone companies usually
do not record the telephone numbers of local calls, petitioner argued
that his call to McDonough was a local call and, therefore, his expectation of privacy in dialing this number was "legitimate." 45 The
Court did not accept this argument, reasoning that whether the 4tele6
phone company decides to "make a quasi/permanent record" of
particular numbers dialed should not determine if fourth amendment
protections are invoked.4 v
The Court concluded that the petitioner in all likelihood did not
maintain an actual expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers
he dialed, but assuming he did, "his expectation was not 'legitimate.' "48 The installation and use of a pen register was found not to
constitute a "search" under the fourth amendment, and no warrant
was required.
Justices Stewart and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions, in
which Justice Brennan joined. 49 Both dissenting opinions contended
that persons have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone
numbers they dial, although each opinion focuses on different aspects
of the majority decision.
Justice Stewart's opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined, called
for application of fourth amendment safeguards whenever there are

442 U.S. at 744.
This argument distinguishes United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Telephone
companies are not required by statute, regulation or otherwise, to maintain records of local
telephone calls placed from private telephone lines. See note 42 supra.
46 442 U.S. at 745.
17 Calls placed across town, or dialed directly, would be protected; calls placed across
the river, or dialed with operator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to
make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as
here) the pattern of protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private
corporation.
Id.
48 Id. The phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy" has been interchanged with the phrase
"expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." See United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. at 442. These concepts reflect the'leeway that judges have in making determinations under
the fourth amendment. The customs and values of the past and present translate into rules, case
law and statutes. Necessarily, legitimate expectations of privacy, those that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable, are malleable concepts.
49 Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
14
45

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:65

"broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational
privacy," 50 which necessarily accompany electronic surveillance. In
Stewart's view, such "incursions" occur whenever there is installation
and use of a pen register on a private telephone line. 51 Justice Stewart
would not distinguish the numbers dialed from a private telephone
and the ensuing conversation for purposes of invoking the
constitutional protection recognized in Katz. 52 It seemed clear to
Stewart that the telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information obtained by a pen register because this
information arises from "private conduct" inside an individual's home
or office,5 3 "locations that without question are entitled to fourth and
54
fourteenth amendment protection.
While recognizing that the telephone numbers which a person
dials from his or her private telephone are more "prosaic" than the
succeeding conversation, Justice Stewart found them not without
"content":
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers
listed in a publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any
who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the
local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not because
such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it
easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places
55
called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life.
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, also joined by Justice Brennan, criticized the majority's holding 56 that individuals have no actual
10442 U.S.

at 746.
51This opinion leaves room for distinguishing the validity of pen registers attached to public
(pay) telephones.
52 It is true, as the Court points out, that under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 [1970 ed. and Supp. V] pen
registers are not considered "interceptions" because "they do not acquire the 'contents' of communications," as that term is defined by Congress. United States v. New
York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159, 166-167, 98 S.Ct. 364, 369, 54 L.Ed.2d
376. We are concerned in this case, however, not with the technical definitions of a
statute, but with the requirements of the Constitution.
442 U.S. at 747, n.1.
53 A corollary question is whether a defendant who is not a member of the telephone
subscriber's household or office staff has "standing" to object to the introduction of evidence
obtained from the use of pen register surveillance. See 442 U.S. at 747, n.2. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978) (an individual, although legitimately on the premises where a search occurs,
does not have standing to suppress evidence obtained in the search if there is no valid property or
possessory interest in either the area searched or the evidence seized).
" 442 U.S. at 747.
55 Id. at 748.
56 J. Marshall also mentions his continuing dissension from the views expression in the
majority opinion of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See 442 U.S. at 742.
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or legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily surrendered to telephone companies. Marshall stressed his view that "constitutional protections are not abrogated whenever a person apprises
5
another of facts valuable in criminal investigations.- 1
Referring to the majority's holding that telephone subscribers do
not have subjective expectations of privacy in the numbers dialed
from their telephone, Justice Marshall repudiated the Court's inference that because subscribers have knowledge that long-distance calls
are recorded for billing purposes, and that messages of "help" are
found in "most" phone books, subscribers are aware that pen registers
are "regularly" used for monitoring local calls. Even assuming a subscriber's knowledge of limited monitoring capabilities of the telephone
company, Marshall concluded that "[tlhose who disclose certain facts
to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not
assume that this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes."58
Justice Marshall acknowledged that the "crux" of the majority's
holding was that whatever expectation of privacy the petitioner may
have had in the telephone numbers he dialed, it is not one "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Marshall interpreted the
Court's holding as a determination that individuals who transmit
information to third parties have "assumed the risk" 5s of disclosure of
that information to the government. This determination, proferred
Justice Marshall, was critically "misconceived" in two respects.
In Justice Marshall's view, resolving that petitioner "assumed the
risk" of detection by using the telephone implies that telephone users
make a choice.6 0 On the contrary, Marshall maintained, "unless a
person is prepared to forgo [the] use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk
of surveillance." 6'
442 U.S. at 748.
442 U.S. at 749. See note 37 supra; California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at

95-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, id.,
elaborates on the "assumption of risk" theory.
The assumption of risk theory is premised on the notion that all telephone subscribers must utilize equipment owned by a third party, the telephone company, in
order to place a call. Accordingly, the theory maintains that it is unreasonable for a
subscriber to assume that the fact of his call passing through the telephone system
will remain a total secret from the telephone company. Essentially, the subscriber
has assumed the risk that the telephone company will record the information obtained by a pen register and release it to law enforcement officers.
Id. at 95-96 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
o 442 U.S. at 749.
6I Id. at 750.
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More importantly, Justice Marshall saw that the risk analysis
permitted the Government to determine the extent of fourth amendment protections. "For example, law-enforcement officials could,
simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of random
samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations, put the
public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such
communications. 6 2 Referring to the majority's concession that, in
' '' 3
certain instances, "a further 'normative inquiry would be proper, 1
Justice Marshall queries why there was no meaningful effort to explain when those instances might be or why this case is not included in
such an inquiry.
In Marshall's opinion, the legitimate expectation of privacy requirement of Katz should not depend upon the risks which an individual can be presumed to assume when disclosing information to third
parties, but upon those "risks he should be forced to assume in a free
and open society."'6 4 Quoting Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
United States v. White,15 Justice Marshall aligned himself with the
author of the standard applied by the Smith majority: "'Since it is the
task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we
should not ... merely recite . . . risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.' '"66 In the foregoing assessment, the "basic values" which underly the fourth amendment must
be evaluated. One of these values, Justice Marshall explained, is the
societal interest in preventing the kind of unrestrained "official surveillance" that a pen register permits. 7 Hence, Marshall resolved
that an individual should be "entitled to assume that the numbers he
dials in the privacy of his home will be recorded, if at all, solely for
the phone company's business purposes."68
Justice Marshall concluded that he would require law-enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant before they cause the installation of a pen register device.

62
83

Id.
Id. The majority "imagined" that situations could exist, "in which Katz' two-pronged

inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 740-41,
n.5.
Id.
85 401 U.S. 745 (1971).

442 U.S. at 750, citing 401 U.S. at 786.
"The use of pen registers, I believe, constitutes ..
an extensive intrusion. To hold
otherwise ignores the vital role telephone communication plays in our personal and professional
relationships." 442 U.S. at 751. See notes 94-95 infra, and accompanying text.
68 Id. at 752.
87
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THE ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITIES FOR PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
IN THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS

Prior to Smith, pen register orders had been issued by a court, to
the police or FBI,69 upon the submission and approval of an affidavit
delineating the facts and need for the device. Federal Courts of Ap71
peal 70 had consistently held that the initial pen register orders were

69 United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
70 See Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); Application of United States of America in the Matter of an Order,
Etc., 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159 (1977).
" It is important to distinguish the initial pen register order (to the police or FBI) from the
order to the telephone company (compelling its assistance). The police cannot implement the
initial pen register order without the assistance of the telephone company. Such orders are
"toothless" if the telephone company refuses to comply and there is no mechanism which can
compel its assistance. The Supreme Court, in United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159
(1977), held that a District Court could authorize the use of pen registers by federal agents as
well as compel a telephone company to provide facilities and technical assistance as a means of
preventing the frustration of the initial order authorizing the use of a pen register.
The authority to compel this assistance from the telephone company was based on the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The act provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The Act itself contains three
limitations. First, the issuance of the writ must be "necessary and proper." The standard used to
measure the extent of this phrase is that of sound judicial discretion. See Ex Parte Republic of
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Second, the writ must be "agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." This limitation has also been interpreted as one of sound judicial discretion. See Price v.
Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). Third, and most important, the writ must be "in aid of [the
court's] respective jurisdiction." The Act does not confer jurisdiction by itself. Thus, the court
which invokes the Act must have independent jurisdiction and must not commit an abuse of
discretion by doing so. See Moore's Federal Practice Vol. 9, § 110.29 at 316-18 (2d ed. 1980).
Prior to United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), only the Sixth Circuit had
authorized compulsory orders to the telephone company for installation of pen registers under
the All Writs Act. That Court emphasized that a telephone company is not an ordinary third
party, but rather "a public utility, enjoying a monopoly in an essential area of communications."
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 389.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits had authorized the compulsory orders under the court's
inherent judicial power. See note 73 infra. These Courts have held: "The authority to compel the
cooperation of the telephone company is in a sense concomitant of the power to authorize pen
register surveillance." United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d at 814. The Court's
"power . . . to order pen register surveillance would be a nullity without the authority to
compel the assistance of the telephone company." United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d at 246. It was for the same reason, at common law, that "a sheriff could require an
unwilling citizen to assist him in executing king's writs, effecting an arrest, quelling riots and
apprehending robbers. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 389.
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authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal73Procedure 4172 or by an
inherent judicial power closely akin to it.
In Smith, Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court,
stated: "This case presents the question whether the installation and
use of a pen register constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ' 74 Also, "[c]ertiorari was granted in order to
resolve indications of conflict in the decided cases as to the restrictions
75 It
imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the use of pen registers.
is apparent from these statements, as well as the absence of reference
to any other constitutional or statutory authority in the decision, that
the applicability of the fourth amendment requirements to pen registers was the only issue which concerned the Court in Smith.

11Rule 41

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:

(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule may
be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of record within the
district wherein the property sought is located, upon request of a federal law
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government.
(b) Property Which May Be Seized with a Warrant. A warrant may be issued
under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of
the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things
otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or which
is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense.
(c) Issuance and Contents. (1) Warrant upon affidavit. A warrant other than a
warrant upon oral testimony under paragraph (2) of this subdivision shall issue only
on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the federal magistrate or state judge and
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate or state
judge is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property and
naming or describing the person or place to be searched. The finding of probable
cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part. Before ruling on a
request for a warrant the federal magistrate or state judge may require the affiant to
appear personally and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses he
may produce, provided that such proceeding shall be taken down by a court reporter
or recording equipment and made part of the affidavit. The warrant shall be
directed to a civil officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in
enforcing any law thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the United
States.
73 Inherent judicial power has been used to effect remedies where none were explicitly
provided by statute. The scope of this doctrine used limitations in terms of what the courts may
not do. Circumventing Title III: The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law Enforcement,
1977 Duke Law Journal 751, 771-72 (1977).
71 442 U.S. at 736.
75 Id. at 738.
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The first amendment, 76 fifth amendment, 77 Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,78 Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1965, 7 9 and state or local

" The first amendment is insufficient as a bar to the use of pen registers. If a claim were
made that a pen register had a "chilling effect" on the exercise of free speech, "[t]he proper first
amendment examination entails a balancing of interests that must necessarily be performed on a
case by case basis, and is only partly dependent upon the investigative technique involved."
Elgort, Victor S., Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement
Tool. 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1028, 1043 n.86 (1975). Furthermore, due to the telephone subscriber's
lack of actual knowledge that the pen register has been attached, any "chilling effect" would
apply only to the subscriber's concern that a pen register may be attached to his phone. This
concern would not be decisive in light of an ongoing criminal investigation. See Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
7' The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not violated by use
of pen registers because a telephone subscriber is under no compulsion to place a call. See State v.
Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 1969) (voluntary disclosure of information obtained from
pen registers). In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928), the Supreme Court found
the introduction (as evidence) of incriminating conversations, which a government office obtained with a wiretap, was permissible due to the lack of the element of coercion and involved no
fifth amendment violation (assuming there is no other constitutional restriction to the introduction of such evidence, i.e. fourth amendment).
78 As enacted, § 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976),
forbade the attachment of pen registers without court or subscriber authorization. Originally,
this statute applied to "any communication." Due to the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1965, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), the same law that
enacted the federal wiretap standards, the § 605 prohibitions were limited to "radio communications", thereby no longer applicable to pen registers.
71 Under this statute, the criteria which are set forth for lawful interception are: (1) that only
specified crimes are involved (e.g. racketeering, gambling, drugs); (2) judicial approval of a
wiretap request; (3) a judicial finding that normal investigative techniques are inadequate; and
(4) compliance with procedural safeguards before and after the wiretap is in use. See United
States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505 (1974); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518(1)-(10) (1976). "Interception" has been defined by
the Act as "the auralacquisitionof the contents of any wire or oral communication." 18 U.S.C. §
2510(4) (1976) (emphasis added). An "aural acquisition" engages the sense of hearing and pen
registers have been found not to possess this sense. United States v. Falcone et al., 505 F.2d 478,
482 (3d Cir. 1974). "Contents" has been defined by the Act as "including any information
concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport
or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2519(8) (1976). Pen registers neither disclose
the substance of the communication nor the identities of the parties involved. The existence of a
communication cannot be established by pen registers because they do not specify whether calls
are completed. It is for these reasons that pen registers do not "aurally" acquire the "contents" of,
or do not intercept, a communication. As such, they have not been subject to the requirements of
Title III as stated above. Also, "[tihe proposed legislation is intended to protect the privacy of the
communication itself and not the means of the communication." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 90 (1968).
"The legislative history confirms that there was no congressional intent to subject pen
registers to the requirements of Title III." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
See 1968 U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News, at 2178. However, where there has
been a valid order approving a wiretap under Title III requirements, the order is also sufficient
to encompass authority for the use of a pen register. See United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp.
405 (MD Fla. 1972).
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electronic surveillance statutes8" have all been rejected as possible
authority for procedural protections in the use of pen registers. Notwithstanding these holdings, alternative authorities for procedural
protections in the use of pen registers remain.
The Supreme Court in Smith did not use the standards for procedural protections included in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4181
(Searches and Seizures) which the Court relied on in United States v.
New York Tel. Co.8 2 and many other courts had adopted. 83 In New
York Tel. Co., the Supreme Court held that a District Court had the
power, under Rule 41, to authorize the installation of pen registers on
telephone lines upon a showing of probable cause. Case law stresses
that Rule 41 embodies standards conforming with requirements under
the fourth amendment, but "are not coextensive with the Amendment. '84 If it is determined that Rule 41 still applies to pen regis-

80The District of Columbia wiretap and electronic surveillance statute, 23 D.C. Code § 541;
1967 Supp. V. 1972, which is typical of the majority of state or local statutes, does not control
the use of pen registers. The term "intercept" is used in this statute and defined as "the aural
acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device." D.C. Code Ann. § 23-541(3) (1967 Supp. V. 1972). This language is identical to the
federal statute, and the same rational is applicable for not considering pen registers within the
authority of the D.C. Code. See note 79 supra. The legislative history to the D.C. Code provides
a strong inference that Congress desired the District of Columbia wiretap provisions to follow
closely and conform to the federal counterpart. See H. Rep. No. 907, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 77
(1970); S. Rep. No. 538, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., 18 (1969), Accord, Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. Code
Ann. § 10-401 (1974, Cum. Supp. 1978) (where it states: "'Intercept' means the aural acquisition
of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device.") (emphasis added); Fla. Stat. § 24-934.02 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (identical to
Maryland statute); Cal. Penal Code § 49-631 (West, 1969) (which prohibits wiretapping "to
learn the contents or meaning or any message, report, or communication . . . without the
consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner.") (emphasis
added); N.Y. Penal Law § 39-250.00 (McKinney 1965, as amended December 1, 1979) (wherein
it states: "'Mechanical overhearing of a conversation' means the intentional overhearing or
recording of a conversation or discussion .. ")(emphasis added); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ct.
272, § 99B(4) (West 1979) (which defines the term "interception" to mean: "to secretly hear,
secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or record the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any intercepting device.") (emphasis added); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 53a-1 (West Revised as of 1979) (identical to New York statute).
8" See note 72 supra.
82 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
'3See note 70 supra, and accompanying text.
4 United States v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Navarro,
429 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 679-80 and n.14 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Tjoflat J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit, in Haywood admonished that a search by
federal law enforcement officials, in violation of Rule 41, affords the accused a right to exclusion
of the evidence thereby obtained but does not in and of itself amount to a violation of the fourth
amendment.
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ters, 85 even though the use of pen registers is not considered a search
under the fourth amendment, it may provide authority for procedural
protections in the use and installation of pen registers without invok6
ing the applicability of the fourth amendment .
Similarly, the inherent judicial power doctrine has often been
relied upon where a court's ability to monitor the use of a pen register
was involved.8 7 Further, the All Writs Act 88 may be used in aid of a
court's "potential jurisdiction," thereby establishing the authority of a
court to require the issuance of a pen register order to the police or
FBI prior to the installation of a pen register device. 89

85 Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 delineates specific procedures to be utilized in the issuance of search
warrants. As Smith has determined that a pen register does not invoke the fourth amendment
search warrant requirement, the use of a pen register is not considered a search under the fourth
amendment. However, if the Supreme Court was able to hold, in New York Tel. Co., that Rule
41 applies to pen registers without determining the applicability of the fourth amendment, it is
apparent that Rule 41 can apply whether the fourth amendment is invoked or not. 434 U.S. at
169-70. See note 84 supra. This conclusion is bolstered by reference to H. Rep. No. 1396, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 569 (1980), concerning pen registers, which states, "if the telephone company is
unwilling to cooperate, the law enforcement official must apply for a search warrant under Rule
41." See notes 90-93 and accompanying text, and Appendix A, infra.
. s6The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the ground rules for fair and orderly
procedures in administering criminal justice. It is well established that a violation of the
provisions of the rules may lead to the suppression of evidence thereby obtained. See, e.g.,
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). In the context of pen registers, Fed.R.Crim.P. 41
may thus provide authority for suppressing the evidence obtained from use of pen registers.
"The purpose of deterring unlawful conduct in the area of criminal investigation will be
better served ...by subjecting the use of pen registers to the procedures of Rule 41 than to none
at all." Coghill, Cornelius Wesley, Criminal Procedures-PenRegisters: Compelling Third Party
Assistance Under the All Writs Act, 56 North Carolina L. Rev., 751, 760 (1978).
In Application of United States of America For An Order, Etc., 616 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.
1980), the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's reliance on Rule 41, in addition to the All
Writs Act, as authority for the issuance of an order permitting use of a tracing device which is
analogous to a pen register (See note 89 infra.). This Court acknowledged the Smith decision's
rejection of a constitutional objection to the installation of a pen register device. Id. at 1128.
87 See note 73 supra. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. John,
508 F.2d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Best, 363
F. Supp. 11, 17-18 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla.
1970). Both the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits have suggested that the inherent authority of a
district court to issue a pen register order has been "necessitated" by the special nature of
electronic communications. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d at 245;
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d at 811 and n.2. These courts, in relying upon
their inherent judicial authority to regulate the use of pen registers, emphasized that there was
probable cause for the use of the device.
8 See note 71 supra.

89See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). Also, in Application of United States of
America For An Order, Etc., 616 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit upheld the
District Court's order, pursuant to the All Writs Act, in aid of it's potential jurisdiction to receive
an indictment if significant violations of the law were discovered by the use of a telephone
tracing device which was analogous to a pen register. Both the ESS telephone tracing device
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These alternative authorities for procedural protections in the use
of pen registers may be unnecessary if Congress takes action on certain
proposed legislation. On September 25, 1980, the House Committee
on the Judiciary published a report to accompany H.R. 6915 which
discusses the substantive provisions of Title I of the proposed Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980.90 Chapter 65 (Search and Seizure),
subchapter III: sections 6541-6546 (Pen Registers), describes comprehensive guidelines (i.e. procedural protections) for the application of
pen register orders, the issuance of those orders, and the subsequent
monitoring of the use of pen registers. Under these provisions, federal
authorities will be required to obtain a court order9 ' by submitting an
application justifying the applicant's belief that an order should be
issued. Most importantly, these provisions would require the court to
determine, on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, that
there is "a reason to believe that the information likely to be obtained
'' 2
by the pen register is relevant to a legitimate criminal investigation."
The remaining sections of this subchapter provide: specific requirements for the contents of the pen register order; guidelines on the
period of time which a pen register order may stay in effect; and
93
responsibilities of the telephone company.
(commonly known as a "grabber") and the pen register are designed to record, through the
monitoring of electrical impulses created by the turning of the telephone dial, actual telephone
numbers:
neither system is intended to monitor or record the contents or oral telephone
communications, nor does either establish whether or not a given call has actually
been completed. Rather, each device simply produces a listing of telephone numbers: the pen register records the telephone numbers to which all outgoing calls are
made from the monitored telephone, while an ESS trace records the numbers from
which incoming calls to the subject telephone have been made.
Id. at 1127. Furthermore, the All Writs Act (and the inherent judicial power doctrine) can be
viewed in conjunction with Fed.R.Crim.P. 57(b) which provides: "'Ifno procedure is specifically
prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules
or with any applicable statute." See United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir.
1965); United States v. Remolif, 227 F. Supp. 420, 423 (Nev. 1964); Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 n.8 (1962) (applying the analogous provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 83.).
10H. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 568-571 (1980). Although H.R. 6915 has technically died with the termination of the 96th Congress, 2d Session, it is scheduled to be introduced
to the 97th Congress. See Appendix A for text.
"I Unless a specific emergency situation exists as described in section 6544 of the proposed
Act. See Appendix A. If the telephone company will cooperate with federal authorities, there
need not be judicial approval in order to use a pen register since the device is installed on
telephone company property. However, "[t]he provisions of the proposed code regulating the use
of pen registers are consistent with current Department of Justice policy, which recognizes that
many telephone companies are unwilling to cooperate in the installation oJ a pen register
without a court order." H. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 568, 569 (1980) (emphasis
added).
'2Section 6543. See Appendix A.
93 See Appendix A.
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CONCLUSION

The absence of any constraints on police use of pen registers is
one scenario which may emanate from the Smith decision. If this
occurs, police could conceivably install pen registers, indefinitely, on
every phone in their respective jurisdictions.
The dissenters in Smith recognized the risks which inhered in the
majority decision. Although they may have overstated the problem, it
nonetheless deserves serious attention. "Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede
certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are
9' 4
the hallmark of a truly free society.
It is submitted that procedural protections, enforceable in a court
of law, are necessitated for the installation and use of pen registers.
Courts must be involved in the process, and provide procedural protections whenever pen registers are to be utilized by law enforcement
officials. As Justice Marshall elucidated in his dissenting opinion:
"Particularly given the Government's previous reliance on warrantless
telephone surveillance . . . , I am unwilling to insulate the use of pen
registers from independent judicial review.""5
Although Smith determined that the installation of a pen register
is not a "search" and is, therefore, not subject to fourth amendment
requirements of a warrant based upon probable cause, the opinion
does not rule out the applicability of other authorities to provide
guidelines in this area. The suggested language in the Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980 provides a lucid example of guidelines which
would constitute the requisite procedural protections.
If the Supreme Court is not willing to qualify its decision in
Smith, Congress is best equipped to determine which standards and
procedures are to be implemented in the application of pen register
orders, the issuance of those orders, and the subsequent monitoring of

11442

U.S. at 751 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
95 Id. See, e.g., Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. 1193 (D.C. 1977); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 463 F.
Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). It is important to note that procedural protections need not undermine the use of pen registers as effective investigative tools in the apprehension of particular
criminals (e.g. those involved in gambling, racketeering, prostitution, wirefraud and annoying
or obscene phone calls). See Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 816 (Md. 1978);
United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d at 608-09 and 608 n.2; 1968 U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News at 2159-61; Silver, Edward S., The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem:
A Prosecutor'sView, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 835 (1960); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
at 178.
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the use of the pen register devices.9 6 This determination is conspicuously absent and is one which requires prudent analysis. It would be
a bright prospect if Congress acts, via the proposed Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980, or comparable authority, to clarify what has
been an obfuscated area of the law.

" "It is indeed unfortunate that Congress was not more specific in its treatment of the pen
register in Title III, since the device is a useful law enforcement tool." Circumventing Title III,
The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law Enforcement, 1977 Duke L. J. 751, 774 (1977).
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Appendix A
September 25, 1980
Report of the
House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
H. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 568-571 (1980)
(Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980)
CHAPTER 65-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SUBCHAPTER III-PEN REGISTERS

§ 6541-Authorization for pen register
Section 6541 provides that no Federal authority may install or
use a pen register without first obtaining court order, unless such
installation or use is in connection with an emergency, as provided for
in § 6544 of the proposed code.
§ 6542-Applicationfor an order for a pen register
Section 6542 requires that an application for use of a pen register
be made under oath and in writing and include the identity of the law
enforcement officer making the application and a statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the applicant's belief
that an order should issue.
§ 6543-Issuance of an order for a pen register
Subsection (a) provides that the court shall issue an order authorizing the installation or use of a pen register if the court determines,
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, that there is
reason to believe that the information likely to be obtained by the pen
register is relevant to a legitimate criminal investigation.
Subsection (b) requires that an order issued pursuant to this
section specify: (1) the identity, if known, of the person to whose
phone the pen register will be attached; (2) the identity, if known, of
the person who is the subject of the investigation; (3) the number of
the telephone to which the pen register will be attached; (4) a statement about the nature of the criminal investigation to which the
information likely to be derived from the pen register relates; (5) the
identity of the agency authorized to install and use the pen register;
(6) the time period during which the use of the pen register is authorized. The order must also direct, if the applicant so requests, that a
communications common carrier, landlord, or other specified person
assist in the installation and use of the pen register.
Subsection (c) provides that the order may authorize the use of
the pen register only for the lesser of 30 days or the time necessary to
accomplish the objective of the authorization. The time period may be
extended for an additional period not to exceed 30 days.
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Subsection (d) requires that an order authorizing the installation
and use of a pen register direct a communications common carrier
from whom the phone is leased not to disclose the existence of the pen
register for at least 60 days after the removal of the pen register. The
nondisclosure requirement can be extended for periods of up to 60
days if the court finds that disclosing the existence of the pen register
would (1) endanger the safety of anyone, (2) result in flight from
prosecution, (3) result in tampering with or the destruction of evidence, (4) result in the intimidation of potential witnesses, or (5)
otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation or official proceeding.
§ 6544-Emergency use of pen register without prior authorization
This section permits the installation and use of a pen register
without a court order if a law enforcement officer specially designated
by the Attorney General reasonably determines that (1) an emergency
situation exists with respect to criminal activities threatening to life or
to conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime, necessitating the installation and use of a pen register before a court order
can be obtained, and (2) there are grounds for obtaining a court
order. In addition, an application for a court order must be made as
soon as practicable after the pen register is installed, but in no event
more than 48 hours after the installation. The use of the pen register
must cease when the information sought is obtained or when the
application for an order is denied, whichever first occurs.
§ 6545-Assistance in installation and use of a pen register
Subsection (a) authorizes a communications common carrier, a
landlord, or other person to assist in the installation and use of a pen
register when so required by a court order or when there is an emergency and the law enforcement officer is proceeding under § 6544 of
the proposed code. Subsection (b) authorizes the compensation of a
communications common carrier, landlord, or other person.
§ 6546-Definitionsfor subchapter
This section defines the following terms for the purposes of subchapter III of chapter 65 of the proposed code: "communications
common carrier", "court of competent jurisdiction", "federal authority", "legitimate criminal investigation", and "pen register".

